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Abstract
Much of the excitement in social media analytics revolves around, a) capturing large-scale 
collections of naturally-occurring talk, b) repurposing them as data, and, c) finding ways to speak 
sociologically about them. Researchers have raised concerns over the use of social media data 
in research (for example, boyd and Crawford, 2012; Housley et  al, 2014; Tinati et  al, 2014), 
exploring the ontological and epistemological grounding of the emerging field. We contribute to 
this debate by drawing on Wittgensteinian philosophy to elucidate hitherto neglected aspects; 
namely that it is not just social scientists who are in the business of analysing social media, but 
users themselves. We explore how mainstream social media analytics research (1) overinflates the 
importance of sociological theories, concepts and methodologies (which do not typically feature 
in the accounts of social media users), (2) downplays the extent to which social media platforms 
already exhibit order prior to any sociological accounting of them, and, (3) thereby produces 
findings which explain social scientific perspectives rather than the phenomena themselves. We 
reformulate the ontological and epistemological basis of social media analytics research from a 
Wittgensteinian perspective concerned with what it makes sense to say about social media, as 
members of society and as researchers studying those members. Such a project aims to explore 
social media users’ language as a practice embedded within the context of social life and online 
communication. This reflects the everyday use of language as an evolving toolkit for undertaking 
social interaction, pointing towards an alternative conception of social media analytics.
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What would Wittgenstein say about social media?
Social media platforms are embedded in our cultural lives and are integral to how we 
think about social interaction. Because of this, and as part of a wider academic interest in 
‘Big Data’, social researchers have increasingly engaged with social media platforms as 
vast collections of unscripted and unsolicited indicators of opinion and experience. 
Taking these collections as data has proven productive for researchers in the emerging 
field of social media analytics, who are increasingly able to use these data to explore 
issues pertinent to the traditional topical base of the social sciences (Baker and McEnery, 
2015; Bingham-Hall and Law, 2015; Burnap et al., 2014; Currie et al., 2016). It has been 
to the field’s credit that researchers have already sought to work through the conceptual 
and methodological implications social media analytics has brought in its wake. This is 
exemplified by recent work on an array of foundational concepts for Big Data research 
and social media analytics (boyd and Crawford, 2012; Housley et al., 2014; Tinati et al., 
2014), where scholars seek to situate peoples’ data generation and usage practices within 
the social sciences’ theoretical, conceptual and methodological canon.
We contribute to this materializing body of work by drawing on the Ordinary Language 
Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958, 2009) to demonstrate different potential 
usages of social media data, and different questions to ask of them. This linkage between 
social media and Ordinary Language Philosophy belies an understanding of social media 
platforms as providing a (digitally-mediated) form of ‘speaking’. Taking Twitter as an 
exemplar case (Tufekci, 2014), we might note that a range of language-usages – things 
that people do with language – are captured by the platform. These include telling sto-
ries, sharing information, promoting an agenda, joking, arguing, critiquing, reflecting, 
promising, positing, propositioning, defining, redefining, correcting, rebutting, disprov-
ing, praising, aggrandising, supporting, advertising, downplaying, reporting, retracting, 
apologising, justifying, summarising, detailing, generalising, stereotyping, and so on. 
Whilst not wishing to delimit a finite number of language-usages available to Twitter, 
this list serves as an example of how ‘speaking’ (as a term and practice) is made up of 
constituent practices. It is such practices that form the topic of Ordinary Language 
Philosophy’s study (Coulter and Parsons (1990) on practices of ‘seeing’).
The keystone of our argument is thus. Social scientists are enthused by the analysis of 
social media, and especially so in deriving concepts, theories and methodologies to 
undertake the work. However, it is important also to recognise that social media users 
themselves are undertaking similar analytical work in the course of their social media 
usage – in order to understand and communicate with others, both researchers and social 
media users alike must constantly analyse, interpret and react to the interactional materi-
als they are presented with (whether they be verbalised words and body gestures or the 
text and images that may be found within a tweet). This is how social life operates gener-
ally and ubiquitously, whether experienced offline or online1. It is equally important to 
recognise that social media users do all this analytic work without requiring a theory of 
their behaviour, without employing conceptual frameworks to support it, and without 
leveraging methodological principles to uncover those things2. Hence, whilst social 
media users are engaged in mutual understandings of how everyday life plays out in 
online spaces, social media analytics research is ostensibly about a different project; 
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namely to incorporate social media usage into its own conceptual lexica, so as to be able 
to speak sociologically about what people do online, post-hoc. We counterpoint recent 
(‘mainstream’) ontological and epistemological work in social media analytics with a 
Wittgenstein-influenced take on social media, which is less concerned with applying 
social science theories, concepts and methods to social media and instead elects to 
describe the orders and organisation that already exist.
The paper proceeds as follows. We outline a key aspect of Wittgenstein’s Ordinary 
Language Philosophy (OLP): his antipathy towards the social sciences as a means of 
capturing language-use and interaction to express things about the world, and his con-
centration on ‘reminders’ and ‘perspicuous representations’ as an alternative means to 
orient to these phenomena. We then summarise burgeoning ontological and epistemo-
logical work that seeks to lay the foundations for the ongoing development of social 
media analytics. Next, we evince OLP as an alternative to mainstream social media ana-
lytics ontological and epistemological thinking, arguing that by starting with a concern 
with the development and deployment of social science theories, concepts and methods 
mainstream approaches neglect to acknowledge the existing order and organisation that 
users bring to social media. As such, mainstream social science thereby produces find-
ings which, we argue, herald insights primarily about their own approach than they do 
the phenomena they purport to explain. Though the approach is widespread throughout 
social media analytics, we demonstrate this by undertaking an OLP-oriented critique of 
two exemplar empirical studies of Twitter data (Heverin and Zach, 2012; Cha et al., 
2010): first, in terms of how social science theory and concepts are leveraged to make 
(ontological) explanations of the world, and second, in terms of how those explanations 
are arrived at (epistemologically) through social science methods. This is followed by a 
more general discussion of OLP as a descriptive endeavour and the implications of this 
for mainstream social media analytics. We then return, in conclusion, to a Wittgensteinian 
concern with ‘what it makes sense to say’ about the multifarious usages of language-
terms demonstrated through everyday social media usage. This, we posit, provides a 
different conceptualisation of social media analytics premised on descriptions of lan-
guage-use as sets of practices embedded in social (and, in principle, online) contexts and 
which operate on the basis of a publically visible, witnessable and accountable order. 
Hence, the present paper contributes to social media analytics by exploring the potential 
for OLP to offer an innovative approach to the qualitative analysis of social media data.
Wittgenstein’s Ordinary Language Philosophy (in brief)3
Given that Wittgenstein scholars do not share a unified account of Wittgenstein’s thought, 
producing a definite statement on what Wittgenstein’s philosophy ‘is about’ is a some-
what perilous activity. Our reading will concentrate on the aspects of Wittgenstein’s phi-
losophy which justify a resistance against the appropriation of everyday language-use as 
materials by which to conceptualise social life.
In Philosophical Investigations (2009), Wittgenstein takes the academy to task on the 
idea of a purely referential language, and on the ontological and epistemological claims 
that result from such a view. A purely referential language is where the meanings of 
words are determined by defining them as associative with things in the world; objects, 
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mental states, theoretical entities, etc. Under this view, how the word ‘yellow’ comes to 
mean anything is through pointing to yellow objects, requiring learners to associate the 
utterance of the word with some property of the object (for example, the colour). Though 
Wittgenstein did not deny that language can be referential, he contended that philosophi-
cal mistakes arise from the idea of language as always and only garnered from referenti-
ality as a fixed method for building and using language. As Hanfling (2006) articulates, 
Wittgenstein’s rejection of an exclusively referential understanding of language is at 
least partially informed by a rejection of philosophy’s tendency to conflate everyday 
language terms with philosophical concepts. As Wittgenstein notes:
When philosophers use a word – ‘knowledge’, ‘being’, ‘object’, ‘I’, ‘proposition/sentence’, 
‘name’ – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever 
actually used in this way in the language in which it is at home?’ (2009: §116)
We [philosophers] take the possibility of comparison [between everyday and philosophical 
usages of words], which impresses us, as the perception of a highly general state of affairs. 
(2009: §104)
In this way, Wittgenstein argues that philosophers have become ‘dazzled’ (2009, §100) 
by the answers that everyday usages of language appear to offer to philosophical prob-
lems. This compulsion may be encouraged by a cultural fascination with scientific and 
logical explanation:
Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted 
to ask and to answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of 
metaphysics and leads philosophers into complete darkness. (Wittgenstein, 1958: 18).
Hence, an understanding of the use of language becomes exasperated by certain activi-
ties associated with academic practice. For instance, solitary reflection on a word leads 
us to consider it in isolation, removed from a context where it is used unproblematically, 
and obscuring the standards surrounding its usage (Wittgenstein, 2009: §38, §593). In 
short, we – philosophers and academics – become distracted by the meanings of words 
that are nearest to us in our own discipline-specific usages, forgetting that other different 
usages of the same word circulate elsewhere (i.e. in everyday life).
To guard against such confusion, Wittgenstein advocates observing how language is 
used in everyday situations:
Consider, for example, the activities that we call ‘games’. I mean board-games, card-games, 
ball-games, athletic games, and so on. What is common to them all? – Don’t say: ‘They must 
have something in common, or they would not be called “games”’ – but look and see whether 
there is anything common to all . . . Are they all ‘entertaining’? Compare chess with noughts 
and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of 
patience. (2009: §66)
Hence, there are multiple different applications of the word ‘game’ which serve to resist 
a singular universal (ie scientific/logical) definition of what a game might be. Yet this 
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does not upset how we deploy the term in our everyday life: as everyday people we know 
that professional football matches and rounds of Pac-Man are both legitimately describ-
able as games. We are also unconcerned by the dissimilarities between the two activities 
which prevent the term ‘game’ from being a logical descriptor of a set of properties or 
qualities of games. Wittgenstein’s OLP orients readers towards precisely these situations 
where word-use is unproblematic – the messy ‘rough ground’ (2009: §107) of everyday 
practices – to see how language functions in the context of its usage:
It was correct that our considerations must not be scientific ones. The feeling ‘that it is possible, 
contrary to our preconceived ideas, to think this or that’ – whatever that may mean – could be 
of no interest to us . . . And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything 
hypothetical in our considerations. All explanation must disappear, and description alone must 
take its place. And this description gets its light – that is to say, its purpose – from the 
philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; but they are solved 
through an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these workings 
are recognized – despite an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by 
coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with. 
Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our 
language. (2009: §109)
Hence, Wittgenstein proffers no theory of language, and rejects the possibility of such a 
theory at all. Instead, he elects to show readers different aspects of language in situ to 
elicit understandings of the various ways in which language gets used. Wittgenstein does 
so via ‘reminding’ us (and encouraging us to remind ourselves) of the different usages of 
language-terms already in circulation, and by providing ‘perspicuous representations’ of 
those cases.
In our everyday language-use, we generally apply words correctly and unproblemati-
cally; as such, it can be illuminating to simply remind ourselves of the ways we use 
language terms, to recover the sense in which those terms have different uses in different 
contexts. Reminding is necessary, since we cannot give unified accounts of all applica-
tions and we need to ‘see’ them to understand the various manifestations:
Something that one knows when nobody asks one, but no longer knows when one is asked to 
explain it, is something that has to be called to mind. (And it is obviously something which, for 
some reason, it is difficult to call to mind.) (Wittgenstein, 2009: §91)
Building on this, Wittgenstein states a need to formulate these reminders as perspicuous 
representations, which should show examples of word use that are complete and at the 
same time open to review. It is the function of a language-term – what it is used to do – 
that makes a representation perspicuous, allowing us to compare and contrast the various 
uses a term may have. Working with language-terms in this way, we can isolate our 
deeply-held uses and see our motivation behind holding a certain view. We can ask: are 
we colouring particular examples of everyday language-use and social life with our phil-
osophical/academic mindset, or are we describing them in such a way as to capture how 
they are embedded in the contexts in which they are given shape and meaning? This is 
how such examples provide perspicuous representation, and this is how perspicuous rep-
resentations provide value in terms of understanding everyday life.
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Ontology, epistemology, and the foundations of social 
media analytics
It is apposite at this point to connect Wittgenstein’s OLP with social media analytics, by 
exploring recent ontological and epistemological work in Big Data research. There have 
been concerns with the developmental direction of Big Data research and social media 
analytics since before research in the field had properly begun (see Savage and Burrows, 
2007). These concerns have been formulated in a variety of studies seeking to work 
through the ontological and epistemological groundings of the field.4 As Burrows and 
Savage note, the advent of Big Data research and social media analytics has made the 
time ripe to re-cover such questions: ‘Big Data does challenge the predominant authority 
of sociologists and social scientists more generally to define the nature of social knowl-
edge’ (Burrows and Savage, 2014: 5). For these reasons, ontology and epistemology 
have emerged as critical debates for the field.
Ontological and epistemological5 studies within Big Data research and social media 
analytics represent an array of approaches, yet nonetheless display shared motivations 
around: a) capturing collections of naturally-occurring talk, opinions, attitudes and expe-
riences on social media platforms, b) repurposing these collections as data to derive 
empirical insights, and c) finding ways to interpret those data by connecting them to exist-
ing social science concepts and theories. Throughout all three of these stages in the wider 
social media analytics strategy, ontological and epistemological thinking is evident.
For instance, of the potential for using social media to capture collections of natu-
rally-occurring talk, opinions, attitudes and experiences, Housley et al. note that ‘these 
technologies and their allied data have the potential to ‘digitally-remaster’ classic ques-
tions about social organization, social change and the derivation of identity from collec-
tive life.’ (2014: 4). These collections, however, are not to be taken uncritically, and it is 
important to use data as a way to access the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
we are making when we draw them from their native environments. As Felt reminds us:
It is not enough to simply imagine social media posts as a ‘raw’ artifact, separated from the 
systems that produced them. Researchers must consider the processes that produced them. 
Researchers must consider the processes that create a moment as well as the networks involved 
in the situation. This must extend to the algorithms utilized to present the data. (Felt, 2016: 6)
Following data collection through to empirical insights requires an intermediary stage 
where methods and methodologies can be leveraged to realise collections of social media 
posts as research data. This process too has encapsulated various ontological and episte-
mological ideas for researchers. For instance, Edwards et al note that ‘Rather than 
regarding social media data analysis as a surrogate for traditional methods… the experi-
ence of digital social research to date suggests the need for an account of how it might 
augment, and be augmented by, traditional social research methods.’ (2013: 247). Rogers 
highlights the notion of ‘repurposing’ as particularly important here:
Digital methods repurpose or build on top of the dominant devices of the medium, and in doing 
so make derivative works from the results, figuratively and literally. That is, the initial outputs 
may be the same as or similar to those from online devices, but they are seen or rendered in new 
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light, turning what was once familiar – a page of engine results, a list of tweets in reverse 
chronological order, a collection of comments, or a set of interests from a social networking 
profile – into indicators and findings. (Rogers, 2013: 3)
Researchers have also sought to connect such indicators and findings with existing social 
theories and concepts, thereby lending wider relevance to their empirical work as part of 
the broader social science research canon. As Kitchin states, ‘It is one thing to identify 
patterns; it is another to explain them. This requires social theory and deep contextual 
knowledge’ (2014: 8), and it has been argued that only ‘once these [empirical] advances 
have become more embedded and consolidated within theoretical frames’ (Cowls and 
Schroeder, 2015: 3) can social media analytics push social science into new domains. 
Murthy states exactly these aims at the outset of his recent work on Twitter:
Although I examine the practice of social media through specific Twitter-mediated events, this 
book’s emphasis is both explanatory and theoretical. Specifically, my prime aim is to better 
understand the meanings behind Twitter and similar social media through concise yet 
sophisticated interpretations of theories of media and communication. (Murthy, 2013: xii)
More recently, Lupton and others (Beer, 2016; Boellstorff, 2016) have sought to use 
arguments drawn from Science and Technology Studies to ‘identify and think through 
some of the ways in which sociocultural theory may contribute to understanding data 
practices’ (Lupton, 2016: 1). In this way, social media analytics is integrating ever more 
closely with the wider sociological project within which it originates, by way of explor-
ing how other sociological sub-disciplines with similarly pertinent ontological and epis-
temological concerns have embraced those issues.
An Ordinary Language Philosophy take on social media 
analytics
Above, we have characterised social media analytics as, amongst other things, seeking to 
methodologically and epistemologically repurpose the naturally-occurring collections of 
online talk as data (Rogers, 2013) and to produce ontological claims about those collec-
tions by mapping them onto social science theories (Beer, 2016; Boellstorff, 2016; Cowls 
and Schroeder, 2015; Kitchin, 2014; Lupton, 2016). Yet seemingly despite the renewed 
focus on ontology and epistemology, these treatments of data simply demonstrate that it is 
possible to talk about social media with sociological terminology without providing a 
justification as to what the value in doing so might be. Hence, with OLP in mind, we more 
carefully unpick what such studies claim of their data. Provocatively, we suggest there are 
grounds to read mainstream social media analytics studies as failing to account for their 
chosen subjects in a way that increases our understanding of those subjects.
To concretise the concerns of OLP as an alternative to mainstream social media ana-
lytics research, we now present two cases of empirical studies of Twitter data to locate 
their respective mis-steps: one ontological (Heverin and Zach, 2012) and one epistemo-
logical (Cha et al., 2010). To illustrate our concerns we will focus on each of these two 
particular studies as exemplar cases, followed by brief descriptions of other studies 
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where similar ontological or epistemological mistakes are evident to show how the prob-
lems pervade more generally across social media analytics. Our concern is not with the 
studies themselves, but their capacities as representative of the ontological and epistemo-
logical confusions that arise from mainstream social media analytics studies6.
Ontology: a mis-step in the use of theory and concepts
Heverin and Zach (2012) study the usage of Twitter hashtags as a communication 
medium around three U.S. campus shootings. They describe the various different sorts of 
interactional work undertaken by users at different points along the course of each event:
Through an analysis of the content of the microblogging communications sent via Twitter 
during three similar, violent crises, we found that information-sharing behaviors dominated the 
early response phase, also known as the critical period, of violent crises. We also found that 
opinion sharing increased considerably during the critical period and peaked in all three crises 
during the recovery phase. (2012: 34)
To situate these descriptions within the wider social science literary canon, Heverin and 
Zach draw on Dervin’s (1983) theory of collective sense-making, ‘defined as a process 
by which individuals attempt to bridge the cognitive gaps that they face in everyday life 
as well as during nonroutine times such as crises’ (2012: 34). For Heverin and Zach, the 
concept of sense-making explains the communicative practices described as an ontologi-
cal claim about the world:
Frameworks such as Dervin’s (1983) sense-making theory help provide a basis for understanding 
how individual behaviors can contribute to the sense-making of others and expand the way in 
which we can look at microblogging communications by applying [a] user-centred approach to 
understanding information needs during crisis situations from the perspective of the individual 
actors. (2012: 45)
From the OLP perspective, the descriptive element of Heverin and Zach’s (2012) study 
– the investigation of how language is used in specific settings to do certain types of 
work – is where its value lies. However, Heverin and Zach make an ontological leap in 
their claim that the communicative practices they investigate constitute a demonstration 
of a theoretical construct (ie collective sense-making). Given this, it is a more compelling 
account of Heverin and Zach’s (2012) study that the conceptual orientation to sense-
making is less explanatory of the communicative practices to which it is ostensibly 
applied, and more explanatory of the social scientific enterprise generally in that it dem-
onstrates a commitment to producing concepts around the practices social scientists are 
in the business of observing.
Similar ontological leaps are made by Cheung and To (2016) in their characterising of 
the social media interactions between consumers and corporations on social media via 
the theory of planned behaviour, by Ellison et al in their examination of Facebook users’ 
practices of mobilising help from their networks via ‘social capital conversions’ (2013: 
155) and by Tufekci’s (2008) investigation of privacy on Facebook and Myspace through 
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the lens of Altman’s theory of privacy as a process of optimization between self-disclo-
sure and withdrawal. In all of these cases, it is unclear as to what subsequently explaining 
users’ practices in terms of their respective a priori theoretical commitments (and thereby 
abstracting the explanatory contribution of the study beyond the user-practices they pur-
port to study) adds to our understanding of them.
Epistemology: a mis-step in the use of methods and methodologies
Cha et al. (2010) investigate the notion of ‘influence’ on Twitter – how it is exerted and 
responded to by others. They begin by noting Twitter as an area where our existing con-
ceptualisation of influence does not apply neatly:
The traditional influentials theory [where one person has influence and others connected to 
them are thereby influenced] has . . . been criticised because its information flow process does 
not take into account the role of ordinary users (2010: 11)
Here, ordinary users are seen as having greater agency in exerting and responding to 
influence than in traditional models, which the authors deem more befitting the ‘viral’ 
nature of Twitter. To enable their investigation into influence, Cha et al. (2010) make an 
epistemological leap to render peoples’ orientations to influence amenable to social sci-
entific analysis. This is performed by the ‘datafication’ of influence into ‘three “interper-
sonal” activities on Twitter7 . . . [which] represent the different types of influence of a 
person’ (Cha et al., 2010: 11–12), to be measured and explained via statistical analysis.
The initial premise – Cha et al.’s (2010) orientation to influence as consisting of com-
municative practices demonstrable within users tweets – is appealing. Descriptions of 
the ways in which influence was performed and achieved by tweeters in practice would 
be highly illuminating. Yet it is the subsequent (epistemological) leap that we find prob-
lematic from the OLP perspective. In order to explore influence as a phenomenon, Cha 
et al. (2010) reduce influence down to the three aforementioned metadata elements (fol-
lowers, retweets and mentions). Hence, the study produces a statistical analysis of how 
these three modes of interaction correlate with one another, with findings indicating such 
things as tweeters who receive more retweets and mentions are more influential than 
those who simply have a higher number of followers. However, the repurposing of inter-
actions into statistical variables taken to stand for ‘influence’ is an epistemological move 
that fails to increase our understanding of what influence is to the tweeters who exert and 
respond to it in the context of their everyday Twitter lives. Cha et al.’s (2010) study 
promises an exploration of how influence is experienced by Twitter users, yet their epis-
temological work undermines the extent to which the study can capture users’ experi-
ences of influence as being expressed through the language and contextual background 
of a tweet. Hence, we might rather see the analyses offered by Cha et al (2010) as being 
less about ‘influence’ and more a demonstration of ‘datafication’ as a method of produc-
ing analyses of large volume social media data that accord with the traditional social 
science methodological toolkit.
Such a move is apparent also in the work of Ceron et al. (2014) who model political 
preference on Twitter with a semi-automated version of sentiment analytic metrics for 
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linguistically coding large data corpora, in Huang et al.’s (2013) characterisation of 
‘online proximity’ (the feeling of closeness or distance from those we interact with 
online) as being measurable through space, time and homophily, and in Gilbert and 
Karahalios’ development of ‘tie strength’ (2009: 212) as a means of using various inter-
actions and metadata to measure relationships between Facebook users. However, as 
with Cha et al.’s (2010) study, it is unclear as to what these ‘datafied’ analyses of digi-
tally-mediated interactions might relate to and/or represent the phenomena they purport 
to be about.
Discussion: explanation and description
Given the negative problematising that OLP applies to mainstream social media analyt-
ics, it is important also to explore how OLP might be used positively in terms of provid-
ing researchers with an alternative entry point into social media. Here, we build on OLP’s 
affinity towards description (as opposed to explanation) as a means of understanding 
social life. The questions here are: what counts as an explanation of the things we (social 
media analysts) seek to understand about the world? And how can we access those expla-
nations? As we have argued, social media analytics is currently exploring answers to 
these questions via ontological and epistemological moves. However, if our goal is to 
understand peoples’ practices when they use Twitter to communicate within specific 
contexts, then OLP reminds us that we would do well to concentrate, foremost, on pro-
ducing descriptions of those activities.8 As Winch – an advocate of Wittgenstein’s OLP 
– suggests, description can provide an equally illuminating alternative to theoretical and 
conceptual explanation:
Understanding is the goal of explanation and the end-product of successful explanation. But of 
course it does not follow that there is understanding only where there has been explanation; 
neither is this in fact true. (1990: x)
This focus on description attunes us to peoples’ own accounts of the activities they are 
undertaking, and encourages us to think with clarity on how theirs and our descriptions 
do the work of describing (i.e. how we might recognise one activity as a particular kind 
of activity and not something else). Notably, it is a rare case where social theories and 
concepts might be found within everyday language use – as Hutchinson et al. note:
It is not, first, for sociologists to decide what someone is properly said to be doing. The language 
they are using, after all, does not belong to them, but is one that they speak because they belong 
to the language communities about and within which they write: ‘washing hands’ isn’t a 
description that any sociologist has contrived, and it is indisputable that whether it is the correct 
thing to say or not should be decided by the way in which language works, is used, within the 
activities to which it belongs (to domestic affairs: clean those dirty hands!; to medical situations: 
‘scrub up before surgery’; or to affairs of state: washing hands as the ceremonial way to rescue 
oneself). (2008: 77–78)
Thus, to simply say that someone is ‘washing their hands’ without a sense of the context 
surrounding the statement provides only an incomplete description which immediately 
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begs further questions – who is washing their hands, and why? It is precisely such context 
that lends any description of a given activity its intelligibility and its criteria for correct 
application. And it is the visibility of those contexts and criteria within language-use (for 
example, using the term ‘scrubbing up’ as a distinctively medicalised turn of phrase 
rather than just ‘washing my hands’) and social interaction (such as wearing green over-
alls and working in a hospital) which provide ample footing for researchers seeking to 
understand how social life is organised.
Though not necessarily within the topical remit of social media analytics, several 
researchers in the fields of Human-Computer Interaction and Computer-Supported 
Cooperative Work have undertaken qualitative analyses that do attend to the everyday 
practices through which people generate and use digital data (Brown et al, 2013; Brown 
et al., 2015; Didžiokaitė et al., 2017; Licoppe et al., 2016; Reeves and Brown, 2016; 
Reeves et al., 2015; Rost et al., 2013) and these works provide insight into how we might 
put Wittgenstein’s ideas to practice. For instance, Rost et al (2013) examine users’ 
‘check-in’ practices on Foursquare, Brown et al. (2015) explore mobile internet searches 
as an activity jointly organised around information retrieval and conversational interac-
tion, and Licoppe et al. (2016) analyse the conversational and interactional practices 
through which users establish matches on the gay dating app Grindr. All of these studies 
are premised, first and foremost, on deep descriptions of the interactions at hand. What 
these studies demonstrate is an attunement to the practical interactions that play out 
through and are afforded by digital platforms, as opposed to extracting those interactions 
out of their local contexts via ‘datafying’ them or analysing them according to their fit 
with sociological theories or concepts.
Turning back now to social media analytics, we can see that researchers in this areas 
do not typically share this focus on producing descriptions grounded in the interactional 
contexts available through social media data, and this has led to ontological and epistemo-
logical mis-steps. Taking our exemplar cases for instance, both Heverin and Zach (2012) 
and Cha et al. (2010) allude to the possibility of describing the activities they take as their 
subjects in such a way, yet neither focus on description as the primary purpose of the 
study. Heverin and Zach (2012) downplay the descriptive element of tweeting practices 
around campus shooting events in favour of exploring how those activities might be 
explained with reference to ‘collective sense-making’. Cha et al. (2010) set up the notion 
of influence in such a way as to make a descriptive account possible, yet neglect to under-
take the descriptive work in favour of a ‘datafied’ version of influence based on a small 
selection of tweeting practices. This connects back to Wittgenstein’s comments, outlined 
above, on language as not purely referential: the aforementioned researchers commit ref-
erential fallacies when they claim that social media users’ interactions map neatly onto the 
existing theory of collective-sense making (Heverin and Zach, 2012), and when they work 
from the assumption that social media users’ conception of ‘influence’ is identical to the 
definition of ‘influence’ in social science research and has the capacity to be neatly encap-
sulated in a simplistic model based on the ‘datafication’ of three metrics (Cha et al., 2010). 
In making these referential fallacies, both studies produce explanations, yet the ontologi-
cal and epistemological work involved in producing those explanations gives grounds to 
question whether what they are explaining is the subjects they profess to study or the 
assumptions and methods that social media analytics employs to make sense of the world.
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As Wittgenstein might have it, both of these studies (and those listed alongside them) 
are dazzled by the idea that the everyday language captured in social media data can be 
used to produce direct answers to social scientific problems. However, social media ana-
lytics typically operates without acknowledging the effects of the translation of social 
media posts from ‘everyday language’ to ‘data’ and ‘analyses’, i.e. where we typically 
undertake ontological and epistemological work to wrangle the phenomena at hand into 
shapes we can comfortably handle. This has been, in fact, a lingering promise of ‘Big 
Data’ research (as the substrate of social media analytics) for academia as well as in 
marketing, industry, policy and other sectors working in the emerging field: that new 
data sources and new computational techniques can afford quick, cheap, highly-
reproducible, impactful, theoretically-informative and methodologically-innovative 
empirical findings (Savage and Burrows, 2007, 2009; Burrows and Savage, 2014). 
Social scientists, with the keen methodological focus that characterises their field, have 
been amongst the most critical and reflexive users of social media data (boyd and 
Crawford, 2012; Housley et al., 2014; Tinati et al., 2014) and this is to their credit. 
However, Wittgenstein’s OLP – chiefly, his antipathy towards the academy’s objectify-
ing of everyday language – provides ample justification for us to have to reconsider how 
we use social media data in our attempts to understand the lives of those that generate 
them. We argue that this is linked to notion that the social sciences (and by extension, 
social media analytics) consist of ‘second-order’ disciplines which are inevitably one-
step removed from the phenomena they take as their subject (Schutz, 1972). For exam-
ple, in producing these kinds of (second-order) study and in acceding to the dream-myth 
of objective (social) science that Wittgenstein warns against, both Heverin and Zach 
(2012) and Cha et al (2010) miss an opportunity to provide deep descriptions of the 
activities and phenomena they purport to investigate. Such descriptions might provide a 
means of reorienting to – being ‘reminded’ of with perspicuous representations – how 
people use language to conduct their social activities on platforms such as Twitter. It is 
precisely these kinds of descriptions that are lacking amongst social media analytics, and 
which Wittgenstein’s OLP encourages us to strive for.
Concluding remarks
Throughout this paper we have elected to make an analogy between the current social 
media analytics zeitgeist and the ontological and epistemological approach of the social 
sciences that Wittgenstein’s OLP situated itself against. We have used this analogy to 
argue that inasmuch as social media analytics provides a motivation to revisit the onto-
logical and epistemological foundations of social research, we should also not neglect 
the opportunity to revisit those bodies of work (for example, OLP) that critiqued and 
problematised those foundations first time around. We do not claim that it is mistaken to 
focus on ontology and epistemology as key concerns of the developing field – the theo-
retical/conceptual explanations and methodological approaches of the social sciences 
(enabled by a concern with ontology and epistemology) are incomparably adept at such 
things as motivating social change and activism, providing counter-narratives, facilitat-
ing critical reflection, and so on. Rather, our two-fold claim is thus. Firstly, it is wrong-
footed to operate as if the particular ontological and epistemological perspectives evident 
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in mainstream social media analytics research can provide direct insight into ‘reality’ as 
it is often assumed they do, and researchers must be careful to explore where their 
insights originate from and accordingly what they can be said to reflect. Secondly, OLP 
stands as a particularly antagonistic alternative/non-mainstream approach to social sci-
ence which has received little attention, yet which is worthy of further exploration.
What exactly an OLP approach to social media research might look like ‘on the shop 
floor’ is difficult to envisage, given the idiosyncrasies which can be expected to arise in 
empirical studies of this ilk (i.e. where the interactional context is everything). We have 
however briefly highlighted the works of several researchers (Brown et al., 2013; Brown 
et al., 2015; Didžiokaitė et al., 2017; Licoppe et al., 2016; Reeves and Brown, 2016; 
Reeves et al., 2015; Rost et al., 2013) who attend specifically to the interactional contexts 
within which digitally-mediated social interactions take place. In applying these kinds of 
ideas to social media analytics specifically, what we hope to have established throughout 
this paper is a sense of the value and the requirements of an OLP alternative to main-
stream social media analytics, as well as pointing the way towards strategies for conduct-
ing research in this way. The strategies we hint at are intended to encourage researchers 
to maintain an orientation to what it makes sense to say about and with social media, and 
to seek out the methods by which social media users publicly display their sense-making 
processes through their language-in-context. It is in these ways that the order and organi-
sation that is essential to social media (as a form of communicative language-use) 
becomes available to researchers. Describing this order and organisation has the poten-
tial to give social media research deep insight into what people use language-on-social-
media to do in their lives.
As a final point: we are reluctant to speak on behalf of Wittgenstein in terms of pro-
viding an answer to the title of the paper – we can only speculate what he might have had 
to say about social media. Nonetheless, should Wittgenstein have had anything to say at 
all about the subject, we hope that we have reflected how he might have said it in such a 
way as to allow social media researchers to take up the mantle for themselves.
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Notes
1. This focus on the organisation of social life through everyday interactions is made particu-
larly tangible by ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967, 2002); itself a field strongly influenced 
by Wittgensteinian philosophy.
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2. We note a parallel between Ordinary Language Philosophy’s motivations to resist the ‘scien-
tific’ appropriation of everyday language usage and Schutz’ (1972) conception of the social 
sciences as a ‘second-order’ discipline. We return to this idea briefly in later sections.
3. Wittgenstein’s thinking is split between pre- and post-Tractatus ([1922] 2005) periods, reflect-
ing a significant change of direction in his philosophy. We will be drawing on Wittgenstein’s 
post-Tractatus philosophy, especially that exhibited in his Philosophical Investigations 
([1953] 2009).
4. Such works include: Beer, 2016; Beer and Burrows, 2013; Boellstorff, 2016; Brooker et al., 
2016a; Brooker et al., 2016b; Burrows and Savage, 2014; Cowls and Schroeder, 2015; 
Edwards et al, 2013; Felt, 2016; Gillespie, 2014; Housley et al, 2014; Kennedy et al., 2015; 
Kitchin, 2014; Kitchin and McArdle, 2016; Lupton, 2016; Marshall, 2012; Murthy, 2013; 
Rogers, 2013; Savage and Burrows, 2009; Tinati et al, 2014; Tufekci, 2014; van Dijck, 2013; 
Vis, 2013.
5. Although the two terms are inevitably interrelated, we use the term ontology to refer to the 
study of the nature of reality and epistemology to refer to our methods of finding out about 
reality. The distinction is between ‘What kinds of thing really exist in the world?’ (Hughes 
and Sharrock, 1997: 5) as an ontological question and ‘How is it possible, if it is, for us to gain 
knowledge of the world?’ (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997: 5) as its epistemological counterpart.
6. Other such studies include: Baker and McEnery, 2015; Bingham-Hall and Law, 2015; 
Bronson and Knezevic, 2016; Burnap et al., 2014; Citron, 2014; Currie et al., 2016; Lachlan 
et al., 2014; Markham and Baym, 2009; Vidal et al., 2015; and many more.
7. These are: 1) the number of followers a user has; 2) the number of retweets their posts garner, 
and; 3) the frequency with which they are mentioned by other users.
8. It is worth noting that similar critiques have been levied at other areas of social science and 
the social scientific enterprise more generally (Button et al., 1995; Button and Sharrock, 
1993; Randall and Sharrock, 2011; Sharrock and Anderson 1984). Our focus on social media 
analytics specifically is motivated by our seeing these issues occurring again in the newly-
emerging field.
References
Baker P and McEnery T (2015) Who benefits when discourse gets democratised? Analysing a 
Twitter corpus around the British Benefits Street debate. In: Baker P and McEnery T (eds) 
Corpora and Discourse Studies: Integrating Discourse and Corpora. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 244–265.
Beer D (2016) How should we do the history of Big Data? Big Data and Society 3(1): 1–10.
Beer D and Burrows R (2013) Popular culture, digital archives and the new social life of data. 
Theory, Culture and Society 30(4): 47–71.
Bingham-Hall J and Law S (2015) Connected or informed?: local Twitter networking in a London 
neighbourhood. Big Data and Society 2(2): 1–17.
Boellstorff T (2016) For whom the ontology turns: theorizing the digital real. Current Anthropology 
57(4): 387–407.
boyd d and Crawford K (2012) Critical questions for Big Data: provocations for a cultural, techno-
logical, and scholarly phenomenon. Information, Communication and Society 15(5): 662–679.
Bronson K and Knezevic I (2016) Big Data in food and agriculture. Big Data and Society 3(1): 
1–5.
Brooker P, Barnett J and Cribbin T (2016a) Doing social media analytics. Big Data and Society 
3(2): 1–12.
Brooker P, Barnett J, Cribbin T and Sharma S (2016b) Have we even solved the first ‘Big Data 
challenge’? Practical issues concerning data collection and visual representation for social 
624 Qualitative Research 17(6)
media analytics. In: Snee H, Hine C, Morey Y, Roberts S and Watson H (eds) Digital Methods 
for Social Science: An Interdisciplinary Guide to Research Innovation. Basingstoke, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 34–50.
Brown B, McGregor M and Laurier E (2013) iPhone in vivo: video analysis of mobile device use. 
In: Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI 
‘13). Paris, France, 27 April–2 May 2013, New York, USA: ACM, 1031–1040.
Brown B, McGregor M and McMillan D (2015) Searchable objects: Search in everyday conversa-
tion. In: Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work 
and Social Computing (CSCW ‘15). Vancouver, BC, Canada, 14–18 March 2015, New York, 
USA: ACM, 508–517.
Burnap P, Williams ML, Sloan L, Rana O, Housley W, Edwards A, Procter R and Voss A (2014) 
Tweeting the terror: modelling the social media reaction to the Woolwich terrorist attack. 
Social Network Analysis and Mining 4(1): 1–14.
Burrows R and Savage M (2014) After the crisis? Big Data and the methodological challenges of 
empirical sociology. Big Data and Society 1(1): 1–6.
Button G, Coulter J, Lee JRE and Sharrock W (1995) Computers, Minds and Conduct. Cambridge: 
Polity Press.
Button G and Sharrock W (1993) A disagreement over agreement and consensus in constructionist 
sociology. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23(1): 1–25.
Ceron A, Curini L, Iacus SM and Porro G (2014) Every tweet counts? How sentiment analysis of 
social media can improve our knowledge of citizens’ political preferences with an application 
to Italy and France. New Media and Society 16(2): 340–358.
Cha M, Haddadi H, Benevenuto F and Gummadi KP (2010) Measuring user influence in Twitter: 
the million follower fallacy. In: Proceedings of the Fourth International AAAI Conference on 
Weblogs and Social Media (ICWSM ‘10), Washington, USA, 23–26 May 2010, Menlo Park, 
California: The AAAI Press, 10–17.
Cheung MFY and To WM (2016) Service co-creation in social media: an extension of the theory 
of planned behaviour. Computers in Human Behavior 65: 260–266.
Citron DK (2014) Hate Crimes in Cyberspace. London: Harvard University Press.
Cowls J and Schroeder R (2015) Causation, correlation, and Big Data in social science research. 
Policy and Internet 7(4): 447–472.
Coulter J and Parsons ED (1990) The praxiology of perception: visual orientations and practical 
action. Inquiry 33: 251–272.
Currie M, Paris BS, Pasquetto I and Pierre J (2016) The conundrum of police officer-involved 
homicides: counter-data in Los Angeles County. Big Data and Society 3(2): 1–14.
Dervin B (1983) An overview of sense-making research: concepts, methods, and results to date. In: 
Annual Meeting of the International Communications Association, Dallas, Texas.
Didžiokaitė G, Saukko P and Greiffenhagen C (2017) The mundane experience of everyday calo-
rie trackers: Beyond the metaphor of Quantified Self. New Media and Society. Online first 
publication (March 24, 2017): 1–18.
Edwards A, Housley W, Williams M, Sloan L and Williams M (2013) Digital social research, 
social media and the sociological imagination: surrogacy, augmentation and re-orientation. 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology 16(3): 245–260.
Ellison NB, Gray R, Vitak J, Lampe C and Fiore AT (2013) Calling all Facebook friends: explor-
ing requests for help on Facebook. In: Proceedings of the Seventh International AAAI 
Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (ICWSM ‘17). Ann Arbor, MI, USA, 8–11 July 
2013, Washington, DC, USA: AAAI, 155–164.
Felt M (2016) Social media and the social sciences: how researchers employ Big Data analytics. 
Big Data and Society 3(1): 1–15.
Brooker et al. 625
Garfinkel H (1967) Studies in Ethnomethodology. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Garfinkel H (2002) Ethnomethodology’s Program: Working Out Durkheim’s Aphorism (edited 
and introduced by Warfield Rawls A). Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Gilbert E and Karahalios K (2009) Predicting tie strength with social media. In: Proceedings of the 
SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ‘09). Boston, MA, USA, 
4–9 April 2009, New York, USA: ACM, 211–220.
Gillespie T (2014) The relevance of algorithms. In Gillespie T, Boczkowski PJ and Foot KA (eds) 
Media Technologies: Essays on Communication, Materiality, and Society. Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 167–193.
Hanfling O (2006) Wittgenstein and the Human Form of Life. London: Routledge.
Heverin T and Zach L (2012) Use of microblogging for collective sense-making during violent 
crises: a study of three campus shootings. Journal of the American Society for Information 
Science and Technology. 63(1): 34–47.
Housley W, Procter R, Edwards A, Burnap P, Williams M, Sloan L, Rana O, Morgan J, Voss A 
and Greenhill A (2014) Big and broad social data and the sociological imagination: a collabo-
rative response. Big Data and Society 1(2): 1–15.
Huang Y, Shen C and Contractor NS (2013) Distance matters: exploring proximity and homophily 
in virtual world networks. Decision Support Systems 55: 969–977.
Hughes JA and Sharrock WW (1997) The Philosophy of Social Research. Essex: Pearson 
Education.
Hutchinson P, Read R and Sharrock WW (2008) There is No Such Thing as a Social Science: In 
Defence of Peter Winch. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing.
Kennedy H, Poell T and van Dijck J (2015) Data and agency. Big Data and Society 2(2): 1–7.
Kitchin R (2014) Big Data, new epistemologies and paradigm shifts. Big Data and Society 1(1): 
1–12.
Kitchin R and McArdle G (2016) What makes Big Data, Big Data? Exploring the ontological 
characteristics of 26 datasets. Big Data and Society 3(1): 1–10.
Lachlan K, Spence PR and Lin X (2014) Expressions of risk awareness and concern through 
Twitter: on the utility of using the medium as an indication of audience needs. Computers in 
Human Behavior 35: 554–559.
Licoppe C, Rivière CA and Morel J (2016) Grindr casual hook-ups as interactional achievements. 
New Media and Society 18(1): 2540–2558.
Lupton D (2016) Digital companion species and eating data: implications for theorising digital 
data-human assemblages. Big Data and Society 3(1): 1–5.
Markham AN and Baym NK (eds) (2009) Internet Inquiry: Conversations About Method. London: 
Sage.
Marshall C (2012) Big Data, the crowd and me. Information Services and Use 32: 215–226.
Murthy D (2013) Twitter: Social Communication in the Twitter Age. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Randall D and Sharrock W (2011) The sociologist as movie critic. In: Rouncefield M and Tolmie 
P (eds) Ethnomethodology at Work. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 1–18.
Reeves S and Brown B (2016) Embeddedness and sequentiality in social media. In: Proceedings of 
the 19th ACM Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work and Social Computing 
(CSCW ‘16). San Francisco, California, USA, 27 February–2 March 2016, New York, USA: 
ACM, 1052–1064.
Reeves S, Martindale S, Tennent P, Benford S, Marshall J and Walker B (2015) The challenges 
of using biodata in promotional filmmaking, ACM Transactions on Computer-Human 
Interaction (TOCHI) 22(3), 11.
Rogers R (2013) Digital Methods. London: MIT Press.
Rost M, Barkhuus L, Cramer H and Brown B (2013) Representation and communication: 
challenged in interpreting large scale social media datasets. In: Proceedings of the 2013 
626 Qualitative Research 17(6)
Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW ‘13). San Antonio, Texas, 
USA, 23–27 February 2013, New York, USA: ACM, 357–362.
Savage M and Burrows R (2007) The coming crisis of empirical sociology, Sociology 41(5): 885–899.
Savage M and Burrows R (2009) Some further reflections on the coming crisis of empirical sociol-
ogy. Sociology 43(4): 762–777.
Schutz A (1972) The Phenomenology of the Social World. USA: Northwestern University Press.
Sharrock WW and Anderson RJ (1984) The Wittgenstein connection. Human Studies 7: 375–386.
Tinati R, Halford S, Carr L and Pope C (2014) Big Data: methodological challenges and approaches 
for sociological analysis. Sociology 48(4): 663–681.
Tufekci Z (2008) Can you see me now? Audience and disclosure regulation in online social net-
work sites. Bulletin of Science, Technology and Society 28(1): 20–36.
Tufekci Z (2014) Big questions for social media big data: representativeness, validity and other 
methodological pitfalls. In: Proceedings of the Eighth International AAAI Conference on 
Weblogs and Social Media, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA, 1–4 June 2014, Palo Alto, California, 
USA: The AAAI Press, 505–514.
van Dijck J (2013) The Culture of Connectivity: A Critical History of Social Media. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Vidal L, Ares G, Machin L and Jaeger S (2015) Using Twitter data for food-related consumer 
research: a case study on ‘what people way when tweeting about different eating situations’. 
Food Quality and Preference 45: 58–69.
Vis F (2013) A critical reflection on Big Data: considering APIs, researchers and tools as data 
makers. First Monday, 7 October 2013. Available at: http://ojs-prod-lib.cc.uic.edu/ojs/index.
php/fm/article/view/4878/3755 (accessed 4 August 2016).
Winch P (1990) The Idea of a Social Science, and Its Relation to Philosophy. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul.
Wittgenstein L ([1922] 2005) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (translated by Ogden CK). 
Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
Wittgenstein L ([1953] 2009) Philosophical Investigations (trans. Anscombe GEM, Hacker PMS 
and Schulte J) Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Wittgenstein L (1958) The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell.
Author Biographies
Phillip Brooker is a research associate at the University of Bath working in the emerging field of 
social media analytics. His research background is in the ethnomethodological study of computer-
ised technologies across various professional and leisure settings (including scientific research and 
amateur music production). His current research carries forward these interests into sociology, 
science and technology studies, computer-supported cooperative work and human-computer inter-
action. He has previously contributed to the development of a social media analytics data collec-
tion and visualisation suite – Chorus (www.chorusanalytics.co.uk) – and currently works on 
CuRAtOR (Challenging online feaR And OtheRing), an interdisciplinary project which focuses on 
how ‘cultures of fear’ are propagated through online ‘othering’.
William Dutton has a background in philosophy; his research focus is in determining how modern 
working methodologies affect organisational interaction, and in particular learning.
Christian Greiffenhagen is a sociologist with a background in computer science concerned with 
developing new methodological and theoretical tools for understanding the impact of new tech-
nologies on social life, in particular, how these transform existing work and learning practices.
